Paper Info
Title
Monotonicity Axioms in Approval-based Multi-winner Voting Rules
Abstract
In this paper we study several monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules. We consider monotonicity with respect to the support received by the winners and also monotonicity in the size of the committee. Monotonicity with respect to the support is studied when the set of voters does not change and when new voters enter the election. For each of these two cases we consider a strong and a weak version of the axiom. We observe certain incompatibilities between the monotonicity axioms and well-known representation axioms (extended/proportional justified representation) for the voting rules that we analyze, and provide formal proofs of incompatibility between some monotonicity axioms and perfect representation.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.5555/3306127.3331731
adaptive agents and multi-agents systems
Keywords
Field
DocType
Multi-winner voting rules,approval ballots,monotonicity axioms
Monotonic function,Mathematical economics,Voting,Axiom,Mathematical proof,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
abs/1710.04246
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (2019)
2
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.36
6
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Luis Sanchez-Fernandez161.74
Jesus Arias Fisteus2284.99