Abstract | ||
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On October 2016 the South Korean cyber military unit was the victim of a successful cyber attack that allowed access to internal networks. Per usual with large scale attacks against South Korean entities, the hack was immediately attributed to North Korea. Also, per other large-scale cyber security incidents, the same types of u0027evidenceu0027 were used for attribution purposes. Disclosed methods of attribution provide weak evidence, and the procedure Korean organizations tend to use for information disclosure lead many to question any conclusions. We will analyze and discuss a number of issues with the current way that South Korean organizations disclose cyber attack information to the public. A time line of events and disclosures will be constructed and analyzed in the context of appropriate measures for cyber warfare. Finally, we will examine the South Korean cyber military attack in terms previously proposed cyber warfare response guidelines. Specifically, whether any of the guidelines can be applied to this real-world case, and if so, is South Korea justified in declaring war based on the most recent cyber attack. |
Year | Venue | Field |
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2017 | arXiv: Computers and Society | Cyber-attack,Computer security,Computer science,Cyberwarfare,Knowledge management,Attribution,Compromise,Time line |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Journal | abs/1711.04500 | European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ECCWS.
p.315-321 (2017) |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Kyong Jae Park | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
Sung Mi Park | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
Joshua James | 3 | 61 | 11.34 |