Title
An improved mechanism for selfish bin packing
Abstract
Selfish bin packing can be viewed as the non-cooperative version of bin packing problem, where every item is a selfish agent and wants to minimize his sharing cost with the other items packing in the same bin. In this paper, we focus on designing a new mechanism (a payoff rule) for selfish bin packing, called modified Dutch treatment mechanism. We first show that the pure Nash equilibrium exists and it can be obtained in polynomial time. We then prove that under the new mechanism, the price of anarchy is between 1.47407 and 1.4748, improving the known results.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1007/s10878-019-00476-0
JOURNAL OF COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION
Keywords
Field
DocType
Selfish bin packing, Mechanism, Nash equilibrium, Price of anarchy (PoA)
Mathematical optimization,Combinatorics,Bin,Computer science,Price of anarchy,Time complexity,Sharing cost,Nash equilibrium,Bin packing problem,Stochastic game
Conference
Volume
Issue
ISSN
42
3
1382-6905
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
6
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Xin Chen100.68
Q. Q. Nong2476.24
Qizhi Fang383.97