Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Exploitation and Mitigation of Authentication Schemes Based on Device-Public Information. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Today's mobile applications increasingly rely on communication with a remote backend service to perform many critical functions, including handling user-specific information. This implies that some form of authentication should be used to associate a user with their actions and data. Since schemes involving tedious account creation procedures can represent "friction" for users, many applications are moving toward alternative solutions, some of which, while increasing usability, sacrifice security. This paper focuses on a new trend of authentication schemes based on what we call "device-public" information, which consists of properties and data that any application running on a device can obtain. While these schemes are convenient to users, since they require little to no interaction, they are vulnerable by design, since all the needed information to authenticate a user is available to any app installed on the device. An attacker with a malicious app on a user's device could easily hijack the user's account, steal private information, send (and receive) messages on behalf of the user, or steal valuable virtual goods. To demonstrate how easily these vulnerabilities can be weaponized, we developed a generic exploitation technique that first mines all relevant data from a victim's phone, and then transfers and injects them into an attacker's phone to fool apps into granting access to the victim's account. Moreover, we developed a dynamic analysis detection system to automatically highlight problematic apps. Using our tool, we analyzed 1,000 popular applications and found that 41 of them, including the popular messaging apps WhatsApp and Viber, were vulnerable. Finally, our work proposes solutions to this issue, based on modifications to the Android API. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1145/3134600.3134615 | 33RD ANNUAL COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE (ACSAC 2017) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
mobile-security,vulnerability,authentication | Virtual goods,Android (operating system),Authentication,Public information,Computer security,Computer science,Usability,Phone,Private information retrieval,Vulnerability | Conference |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
1063-9527 | 1 | 0.35 |
References | Authors | |
19 | 5 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antonio Bianchi | 1 | 351 | 13.41 |
| Eric Gustafson | 2 | 17 | 4.15 |
| Yanick Fratantonio | 3 | 638 | 27.12 |
| Christopher Kruegel | 4 | 8799 | 516.05 |
| Giovanni Vigna | 5 | 7121 | 507.72 |