Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Protecting vehicular networks privacy in the presence of a single adversarial authority. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In vehicular networks, each message is signed by the generating node to ensure accountability for the contents of that message. For privacy reasons, each vehicle uses a collection of certificates, which for accountability reasons are linked at a central authority. One such design is the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) [1], which is the leading credential management system in the US. The SCMS is composed of multiple components, each of which has a different task for key management, which are logically separated. The SCMS is designed to ensure privacy against a single insider compromise, or against outside adversaries. In this paper, we demonstrate that the current SCMS design fails to achieve its design goal, showing that a compromised authority can gain substantial information about certificate linkages. We propose a solution that accommodates threshold-based detection, but uses relabeling and noise to limit the information that can be learned from a single insider adversary. We also analyze our solution using techniques from differential privacy and validate it using traffic-simulator based experiments. Our results show that our proposed solution prevents privacy information leakage against the compromised authority in collusion with outsider attackers. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2017 | IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security | Key management,Information leakage,Differential privacy,Computer science,Computer security,Computer network,Insider,Adversary,Vehicular ad hoc network,Collusion,Certificate |
DocType | ISSN | Citations |
Conference | 2474-025X | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 3 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chang-Wu Chen | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Sang-Yoon Chang | 2 | 70 | 19.22 |
| Yih-Chun Hu | 3 | 4890 | 714.82 |
| Yen-Wen Chen | 4 | 144 | 24.44 |