Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study the problem of designing cyber insurance policies in an interdependent network, where the loss of one agent (a primary party) depends not only on his own effort, but also on the investments and efforts of others (third parties) in the same eco-system (i.e., externalities). In designing cyber insurance policies, the conventional wisdom is to avoid insuring dependent parties for two reasons. First, simultaneous loss incidents threaten the insurer's business and capital. Second, when a loss incident can be attributed to a third party, the insurer of the primary party can get compensation from the insurer of the third party in order to reduce its own risk exposure. In this work, we analyze an interdependent network model in order to understand whether an insurer should avoid or embrace risks interdependencies. We focus on two interdependent agents, where the risk of one agent (primary party) depends on the other agent (third party), but not the other way around. We consider two potential scenarios: one in which an insurer only insures a primary party, and another one in which the insurer of the primary party further insures the third party agent. We show that it is in fact profitable for the primary party's insurer to insure both agents. Further, we show that insuring both agents not only provides higher profit for the insurer, but also reduces the collective risk. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 2017 55TH ANNUAL ALLERTON CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, CONTROL, AND COMPUTING (ALLERTON) | Interdependence,Mathematical optimization,Actuarial science,Risk exposure,Computer science,Third party,Conventional wisdom,Externality,Cyber-Insurance |
DocType | ISSN | Citations |
Conference | 2474-0195 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mohammad Mahdi Khalili | 1 | 21 | 5.19 |
| Parinaz Naghizadeh | 2 | 43 | 9.38 |
| Mingyan Liu | 3 | 2569 | 224.92 |