Paper Info
Title
Constrained VCG Auction for Spatial Spectrum Reuse with Flexible Channel Evaluations.
Abstract
Spatial spectrum reuse significantly enhances spectrum utilization but requires delicate design to avoid co-channel interference. Instead of focusing solely on spectrum efficiency, we consider maximizing social welfare via on-demand channel allocation in this paper. We design a spectrum reuse mechanism for non-symmetric networks, in which the optimal channel allocation that maximizes social welfare is the result of an appropriate bidding method of secondary users (SUs) in the constrained Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. To simplify the constrained VCG auction, we group the SUs into interference-free maximal independent groups (MIGs) using a modified Bron-Kerbosch algorithm. We introduce the VCG auction for MIGs, in which truthful bidding is the optimal strategy for the MIGs. We build a decision process such that the MIGs as representatives of the SUs can update their channel evaluations in each step and submit truthful bids. Furthermore, we approximate and simplify the optimal channel allocation with a greedy algorithm and Dijkstra's algorithm. In our simulation, we compare the proposed methods and demonstrate that our on-demand channel allocation increases social welfare.
Year
Venue
Field
2017
IEEE Global Communications Conference
Approximation algorithm,Vickrey auction,Mathematical optimization,Computer science,Computer network,Communication channel,Greedy algorithm,Spectral efficiency,Channel allocation schemes,Bidding,Dijkstra's algorithm
DocType
ISSN
Citations 
Conference
2334-0983
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.35
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Feixiang Zhang152.77
Xiangwei Zhou245135.87
Mingxuan Sun318020.16