Title
Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time.
Abstract
•Seeking maximum revenue per unit of time leads to auctions with a few bid levels.•Small decrease in revenue per auction brings about large increase in total revenue.•More knowledge about number of bidders improves auction revenue per unit of time.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1016/j.ejor.2017.08.043
European Journal of Operational Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
Auctions/bidding,Dutch auction,Auction revenue,Time-revenue tradeoff,Discrete bid level
English auction,Vickrey auction,Economics,Microeconomics,Dutch auction,Auction theory,Common value auction,Multiunit auction,Forward auction,Revenue equivalence
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
265
3
0377-2217
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
8
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Zhen Li1738.90
Jinfeng Yue214311.37
Ching-chung Kuo3122.10