Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
•Seeking maximum revenue per unit of time leads to auctions with a few bid levels.•Small decrease in revenue per auction brings about large increase in total revenue.•More knowledge about number of bidders improves auction revenue per unit of time. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.08.043 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Auctions/bidding,Dutch auction,Auction revenue,Time-revenue tradeoff,Discrete bid level | English auction,Vickrey auction,Economics,Microeconomics,Dutch auction,Auction theory,Common value auction,Multiunit auction,Forward auction,Revenue equivalence | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
265 | 3 | 0377-2217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 8 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Zhen Li | 1 | 73 | 8.90 |
Jinfeng Yue | 2 | 143 | 11.37 |
Ching-chung Kuo | 3 | 12 | 2.10 |