Paper Info
Title
Secure Sensor Design Against Undetected Infiltration: Minimum Impact-Minimum Damage.
Abstract
We propose a new defense mechanism against undetected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense mechanisms that seek to detect infiltration, the proposed approach seeks to minimize the damage of possible attacks before they have been detected. Controller of a cyber-physical system could have been infiltrated into by an undetected attacker at any time of the operation. Disregarding such a possibility and disclosing systemu0027s state without caution benefits the attacker in his/her malicious objective. Therefore, secure sensor design can improve the security of cyber-physical systems further when incorporated along with other defense mechanisms. We, specifically, consider a controlled Gauss-Markov process, where the controller could have been infiltrated into at any time within the systemu0027s operation. In the sense of game-theoretic hierarchical equilibrium, we provide a semi-definite programming based algorithm to compute the optimal linear secure sensor outputs and analyze the performance for various scenarios numerically.
Year
Venue
Field
2018
arXiv: Systems and Control
Control theory,Control theory,Infiltration (hydrology),Mathematics
DocType
Volume
Citations 
Journal
abs/1801.01630
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
7
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Muhammed O. Sayin13914.04
Tamer Basar23497402.11