Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider a supply chain management problem where a business alliance of small capacity retailers needs to collectively select a unique supplier considering the assignment's efficiency at both the alliance and retailers' level. We model the alliance as a multi-agent system. For this model, we present a modified Vickrey auction algorithm with regret minimization and compare it experimentally with aggregation of preferences by voting and standard Vickrey auction. Through simulation, we show that the proposed method on average reaches globally efficient and individually acceptable solutions. The solutions are evaluated in terms of different social welfare values. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1007/978-3-319-66379-1_6 | Studies in Computational Intelligence |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Business alliance,Decision making,Task assignment,Vickrey auction,Voting,Regret minimization,Fairness,Social welfare | Mathematical economics,Vickrey auction,Alliance,Voting,Computer science,Generalized second-price auction,Auction theory,Supply chain management,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Social Welfare | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
737.0 | 1860-949X | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 10 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Marin Lujak | 1 | 98 | 15.72 |
| Marija Slavkovik | 2 | 125 | 22.60 |