Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
AbstractThe authors' study a noncooperative game problem for queueing control in emergency department ED. One of the challenges to emergency department ED is the control of the urgent patients and the non-urgent patients. The urgent patient which is the primary customer, can be considered as the service interruption in a queueing system. The service interruptions occur frequently and can incur significant delays for the non-urgent patients. Therefore, a non-urgent patient needs to decide whether to join the queue or leave. The scenario is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing game with server interruption where each patient wants to optimize his benefit. It is shown that the individually optimal strategy for joining the queue is characterized by a threshold of queue length. The socially optimal threshold of queue length is also obtained. To bridge the gap between the individually and socially optimal strategies, a pricing mechanism is proposed to toll the service of each non-urgent patient, thus equalizing the two optimal strategies. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.4018/IJITWE.2018010105 | Periodicals |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Emergency Department (ED), Interruption, Patients, Queueing Theory | Emergency department,Toll,Computer science,Queue,Operations research,Queueing theory,Queueing system,Database | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
13 | 1 | 1554-1045 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 1 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zeng Hui | 1 | 1 | 1.03 |
| Ruiling Tian | 2 | 0 | 0.68 |
| Yupeng Liu | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Yumei Hou | 4 | 5 | 0.78 |