Title
Coordination Without Collaboration in Imperfect Games: The Primary User Emulation Attack Example.
Abstract
In cognitive radio networks, an adversary transmits signals with characteristics that emulate those of primary users to prevent secondary users from transmitting. Such an attack is called a primary user emulation (PUE) attack. In this paper, a game theoretical framework is proposed to study the primary user emulation attack (PUEA) on cognitive radio nodes as a game of imperfect information between the secondary users (SUs), who do not exchange game information between them against the adversaries generating the PUEA and to define optimal strategies with minor computational demands. When the SU challenges the PU emulator successfully, updating the information on a cloud-based database enables the rest of the network to know the identity of PUE. As the game evolves, the grand coalition of the secondary users acts as the one without collaboration against the PU emulator playing a winning strategy. The performance of the game for optimal strategies is equal to the performance of the collaborative methods for PUEA detection.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2791519
IEEE ACCESS
Keywords
Field
DocType
PUE attack,imperfect game,cognitive radio,cloud computing
Imperfect,Computer science,Computer network,Emulation,Game theory,Adversary,Perfect information,Cognitive radio,Cloud computing
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
6
2169-3536
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ioanna Kakalou111.04
Kostas E. Psannis244329.71