Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The main threats for the well-known Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are that its encoding is inaccurate and measurement device may be vulnerable to particular attacks. Thus, a general physical model or security proof to tackle these loopholes simultaneously and quantitatively is highly desired. Here we give a framework on the security of BB84 when imperfect qubit encoding and vulnerability of measurement device are both considered. In our analysis, the potential attacks to measurement device are generalized by the recently proposed weak randomness model which assumes the input random numbers are partially biased depending on a hidden variable planted by an eavesdropper. And the inevitable encoding inaccuracy is also introduced here. From a fundamental view, our work reveals the potential information leakage due to encoding inaccuracy and weak randomness input. For applications, our result can be viewed as a useful tool to quantitatively evaluate the security of a practical QKD system. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-018-1830-0 | Quantum Information Processing |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Quantum key distribution,BB84,Weak randomness,State flaws | Quantum key distribution,Imperfect,Information leakage,Quantum mechanics,Algorithm,Hidden variable theory,BB84,Qubit,Randomness,Encoding (memory),Physics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
17 | 3 | 1570-0755 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 4 |
Authors | ||
7 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liang-Yuan Zhao | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Zhen-Qiang Yin | 2 | 8 | 4.93 |
| Hongwei Li | 3 | 47 | 13.04 |
| Wei Chen | 4 | 4 | 2.58 |
| Xi Fang | 5 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Zheng-Fu Han | 6 | 13 | 4.99 |
| Wei Huang | 7 | 44 | 3.52 |