Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Topology-hiding communication protocols allow a set of parties, connected by an incomplete network with unknown communication graph, where each party only knows its neighbors, to construct a complete communication network such that the network topology remains hidden even from a powerful adversary who can corrupt parties. This communication network can then be used to perform arbitrary tasks, for example secure multi-party computation, in a topology-hiding manner. Previously proposed protocols could only tolerate passive corruption. This paper proposes protocols that can also tolerate fail-corruption (i.e., the adversary can crash any party at any point in time) and so-called semi-malicious corruption (i.e., the adversary can control a corrupted party's randomness), without leaking more than an arbitrarily small fraction of a bit of information about the topology. A small-leakage protocol was recently proposed by Ball et al. [Eurocrypt'18], but only under the unrealistic set-up assumption that each party has a trusted hardware module containing secret correlated pre-set keys, and with the further two restrictions that only passively corrupted parties can be crashed by the adversary, and semi-malicious corruption is not tolerated. Since leaking a small amount of information is unavoidable, as is the need to abort the protocol in case of failures, our protocols seem to achieve the best possible goal in a model with fail-corruption.Further contributions of the paper are applications of the protocol to obtain secure MPC protocols, which requires a way to bound the aggregated leakage when multiple small-leakage protocols are executed in parallel or sequentially. Moreover, while previous protocols are based on the DDH assumption, a new so-called PKCR public-key encryption scheme based on the LWE assumption is proposed, allowing to base topology-hiding computation on LWE. Furthermore, a protocol using fully-homomorphic encryption achieving very low round complexity is proposed. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1007/978-3-030-03810-6_1 | THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY, TCC 2018, PT II |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Conference | 11240 | 0302-9743 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 10 |
Authors | ||
6 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rio LaVigne | 1 | 1 | 0.68 |
| Chen-Da Liu Zhang | 2 | 0 | 1.35 |
| Ueli Maurer | 3 | 1 | 2.71 |
| Tal Moran | 4 | 439 | 25.36 |
| Marta Mularczyk | 5 | 0 | 1.01 |
| Daniel Tschudi | 6 | 28 | 4.32 |