Paper Info
Title
MixColumns Properties and Attacks on (round-reduced) AES with a Single Secret S-Box.
Abstract
In this paper, we present new key-recovery attacks on AES with a single secret S-Box. Several attacks for this model have been proposed in literature, the most recent ones at Crypto'16 and FSE'17. Both these attacks exploit a particular property of the MixColumns matrix to recover the secret-key. In this work, we show that the same attacks work exploiting a weaker property of the MixColumns matrix. As first result, this allows to (largely) increase the number of MixColumns matrices for which it is possible to set up all these attacks. As a second result, we present new attacks on 5-round AES with a single secret S-Box that exploit the new multipleof-n property recently proposed at Eurocrypt'17. This property is based on the fact that choosing a particular set of plaintexts, the number of pairs of ciphertexts that lie in a particular subspace is a multiple of n.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1007/978-3-319-76953-0_13
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Keywords
DocType
Volume
AES,MixColumns,Key-recovery attack,Secret S-Box
Conference
10808
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
0
0.34
References 
Authors
14
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Lorenzo Grassi191.89