Title
Interval-valued least square prenucleolus of interval-valued cooperative games and a simplified method.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose the concept of the interval-valued least square prenucleolus of interval-valued cooperative games and develop a direct and an effective simplified method for solving a special subclass of interval-valued cooperative games. In this method, through adding some conditions, the least square prenucleolus of cooperative games is proved to be a monotonic and non-decreasing function of coalitions’ values. Hence, the interval-valued least square prenucleolus of coalition size monotonicity-like interval-valued cooperative games can directly obtained via determining its lower and upper bounds by using the lower and upper bounds of the interval-valued coalitions’ payoffs, respectively. Thus, the proposed method may overcome the issues resulted from the Moore’s interval subtraction and the partial subtraction operator. Examples are used to illustrate the proposed method and comparison analysis is conducted to show its applicability and superiority. Moreover, some important properties of the interval-valued least square prenucleolus of coalition size monotonicity-like interval-valued cooperative games are discussed.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1007/s12351-016-0260-y
Operational Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
Game theory, Interval-valued cooperative game, Least square prenucleolus, Interval computing
Least squares,Monotonic function,Mathematical optimization,Game theory,Operator (computer programming),Subtraction,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
18
1
1866-1505
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.37
7
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Deng-Feng Li196846.12
Yin-Fang Ye220.37