Abstract | ||
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SPARX-128/256 is one of the two versions of the SPARX-128 block cipher family. It has 128-bit block size and 256-bit key size. SPARX has been developed using ARX-based S-boxes with the aim of achieving provable security against single-trail differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this letter, we propose 20-round impossible differential distinguishers for SPARX-128. Then, we utilize these distinguishers to attack 24 rounds (out of 40 rounds) of SPARX-128/256. Our attack has time complexity of 2(232) memory accesses, memory complexity of 2(160.81) 128-bit blocks, and data complexity of 2(104)chosen plaintexts. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2018 | 10.1587/transfun.E101.A.731 | IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
SPARX, block ciphers, cryptanalysis, impossible differential attacks | Theoretical computer science,Mathematics,Calculus | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
E101A | 4 | 1745-1337 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Muhammad ElSheikh | 1 | 1 | 3.41 |
Mohamed Tolba | 2 | 20 | 6.35 |
Amr M. Youssef | 3 | 41 | 10.68 |