Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
It is well-known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is not truthful for all agents. Previous studies in this category concentrate on manipulations using incomplete preference lists by a single woman and by the set of all women. Little is known about manipulations by a subset of women. In this paper, we consider manipulations by any subset of women with arbitrary preferences. We show that a strong Nash equilibrium of the induced manipulation game always exists among the manipulators and the equilibrium outcome is unique and Pareto-dominant. In addition, the set of matchings achievable by manipulations has a lattice structure. We also examine the super-strong Nash equilibrium in the end. |
Year | Venue | DocType |
|---|---|---|
2018 | THIRTY-SECOND AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / THIRTIETH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE / EIGHTH AAAI SYMPOSIUM ON EDUCATIONAL ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Weiran Shen | 1 | 5 | 8.25 |
| Pingzhong Tang | 2 | 133 | 32.06 |
| Yuan Deng | 3 | 25 | 11.91 |