Paper Info
Title
FRProtector: Defeating Control Flow Hijacking Through Function-Level Randomization and Transfer Protection.
Abstract
Return-oriented programming (ROP) and jump-oriented programming (JOP) are two most common control-flow hijacking attacks. Existing defenses, such as address space layout randomization (ASLR) and control flow integrity (CFI) either are bypassed by information leakage or result in high runtime overhead. In this paper, we propose FRProtector, an effective way to mitigate these two control-flow hijacking attacks. FRProtector shuffles the functions of a given program and ensures each function is executed from the entry block by comparing the unique label for it at ret and indirect jmp. The unique label is generated by XORing the stack frame with return address instead of with a random value and it is saved in a register rather than on the stack. We implement FRProtector on LLVM 3.9 and perform extensive experiments to show FRProtector only adds on average 2% runtime overhead and 2.2% space overhead on SPEC CPU2006 benchmark programs. Our security analysis on RIPE benchmark confirms that FRProtector is effective in defending control-flow hijacking attacks.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1007/978-3-319-78813-5_34
Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Keywords
Field
DocType
Control flow hijacking,Control flow protection,Function-level randomization,Code reuse attack
Information leakage,Address space layout randomization,Computer science,Call stack,Control flow,Control-flow integrity,Computer network,Randomization,Security analysis,Spec#
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
238
1867-8211
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
13
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jianming Fu13916.42
Rui Jin29016.41
Yan Lin3104.62