Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Deep Bayesian Trust : A Dominant Strategy and Fair Reward Mechanism for Crowdsourcing. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
A common mechanism to assess trust in crowdworkers is to have them answer gold tasks. However, assigning gold tasks to all workers reduces the efficiency of the platform. We propose a mechanism that exploits transitivity so that a worker can be certified as trusted by other trusted workers who solve common tasks. Thus, trust can be derived from a smaller number of gold tasks assignment through multiple layers of peer relationship among the workers, a model we call deep trust. We use the derived trust to incentivize workers for high quality work and show that the resulting mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible. We also show that the mechanism satisfies a notion of fairness in that the trust assessment (and thus the reward) of a worker in the limit is independent of the quality of other workers. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2018 | arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory | Incentive compatibility,Crowdsourcing,Computer science,Microeconomics,Strategic dominance,Exploit,Certification,Bayesian probability,Transitive relation |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Journal | abs/1804.05560 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Naman Goel | 1 | 11 | 3.60 |
| Boi Faltings | 2 | 3586 | 331.33 |