Title
Nonzero-Sum Risk-Sensitive Stochastic Games on a Countable State Space.
Abstract
The infinite horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost and ergodic-cost nonzero-sum stochastic games for controlled Markov chains with countably many states are analyzed. For the discounted-cost game, we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies in the class of Markov strategies under fairly general conditions. Under an additional weak geometric ergodicity condition and a small cost criterion, the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies in the class of stationary Markov strategies is proved for the ergodic-cost game. The key nontrivial contributions in the ergodic part are to prove the existence of a particular form of a (relative) value function solution to a player's Bellman equation and the continuity of this solution with respect to the opponent's strategies.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1287/moor.2017.0870
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Keywords
Field
DocType
noncooperative stochastic games,risk-sensitive payoff,Bellman equations,Nash equilibria,geometric ergodicity
Correlated equilibrium,Discrete mathematics,Mathematical optimization,Risk dominance,Epsilon-equilibrium,Markov chain,Best response,Normal-form game,Nash equilibrium,Mathematics,Stochastic game
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
43
2
0364-765X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.38
11
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Arnab Basu1103.05
Mrinal K. Ghosh2289.78