Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We construct oligopoly models for nonlinear cost functions of agents under reflexive information. We obtain conditions for Nash equilibria under symmetric and asymmetric agent information in Cournot and Stackelberg reaction models (in case of one or several leaders). |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2017 | 10.1134/S0005117917090089 | Automation and Remote Control |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
oligopoly, nonlinear cost function, Nash equilibrium, Cournot reaction, Stackelberg reaction, information asymmetry | Mathematical optimization,Information asymmetry,Nonlinear system,Oligopoly,Game theoretic,Nash equilibrium,Stackelberg competition,Cournot competition,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
78 | 9 | 0005-1179 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.70 | 2 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mikhail I. Geras'kin | 1 | 2 | 0.70 |
| A. G. Chkhartishvili | 2 | 15 | 4.51 |