Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper suggests an approach for solving the transfer pricing problem, where negotiation between divisions is carried out considering the manipulation game theory model for a multidivisional firm. The manipulation equilibrium point is conceptualized under the Machiavellian social theory, represented by three concepts: views, tactics and immorality. In this approach, we are considering a non-cooperative model for the transfer pricing problem: a game model involving manipulating and manipulated players engaged cooperatively in a Nash game, restricted by a Stackelberg game. The cooperation is represented by the Nash bargaining solution. The transfer pricing problem is conceptualized as a strong Stackelberg game involving manipulating and manipulated divisions. This structure established conditions of unequal relative power among divisions, where high-power divisions tend to be abusive and less powerful divisions have a tendency to behave compliantly. For computation purposes, we transform the Stackelberg game model into a Nash game, where every division is able of manipulative behavior to some degree: the Nash game relaxes the interpretation of the manipulation game and the equilibrium selection for the transfer pricing problem. The manipulation dynamics and rationality proposed for the transfer pricing problem correspond to many real-world negotiation situations. We present an example, that illustrates how manipulation can be employed to solve the transfer pricing problem in a multidivisional firm. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1007/s10957-018-1301-x | J. Optimization Theory and Applications |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Transfer pricing,Negotiation,Manipulation,Non-cooperative,Nash bargaining,91A10,91B24,91B26 | Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Rationality,Transfer pricing,Equilibrium point,Equilibrium selection,Game theory,Stackelberg competition,Mathematics,Negotiation,Bargaining problem | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
178 | 1 | 0022-3239 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.38 | 8 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Julio B. Clempner | 1 | 91 | 20.11 |