Title
Establishing Nash equilibrium of the manufacturer–supplier game in supply chain management
Abstract
We study a game model of multi-leader and one-follower in supply chain optimization where n suppliers compete to provide a single product for a manufacturer. We regard the selling price of each supplier as a pre-determined parameter and consider the case that suppliers compete on the basis of delivery frequency to the manufacturer. Each supplier's profit depends not only on its own delivery frequency, but also on other suppliers' frequencies through their impact on manufacturer's purchase allocation to the suppliers. We first solve the follower's (manufacturer's) purchase allocation problem by deducing an explicit formula of its solution. We then formulate the n leaders' (suppliers') game as a generalized Nash game with shared constraints, which is theoretically difficult, but in our case could be solved numerically by converting to a regular variational inequality problem. For the special case that the selling prices of all suppliers are identical, we provide a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. An explicit formula of the Nash equilibrium is obtained and its local uniqueness property is proved.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-012-9894-3
Journal of Global Optimization
Keywords
Field
DocType
Supply chain management,Leader-follower game,Nash equilibrium,Nonlinear programming
Mathematical optimization,Supply chain optimization,Nonlinear programming,Supply chain management,Single product,Nash equilibrium,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
56
4
0925-5001
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.39
10
Authors
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
James Ang1384.29
Masao Fukushima22050172.73
Fanwen Meng31419.96
Takahiro Noda420.39
Jie Sun51303113.30