Abstract | ||
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Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs) have mainly been designed in order to address road safety issues. In fact, vehicles are supposed to exchange safety related messages among them to enable the drivers to have early responses in front of abnormal situations and potential hazards. However, since these messages have a direct impact on peopleu0027s life, security problems can engender disastrous effects. Authenticating received messages before taking them into consideration arises then as a necessary requirement. Yet, the privacy of the real identities of sending vehicles should be maintained. At the same time, should a vehicle misbehave, it needs to be identified by legal authorities. To deal with these concerns, we presented in a previous work a ticket-based authentication scheme for VANETs that relies on temporary tickets. Vehicles use their temporary tickets to communicate with each other while protecting their privacy. A pairing-free identity-based signature technique is used for authentication. The Trusted Authority (TA) is able to trace back misbehaving vehicles given their tickets and Road Side Units (RSUs) are responsible for discarding them from the network. In this paper, we provide a formal security analysis using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool in order to confirm the safety of the proposal. |
Year | Venue | Field |
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2018 | AINA Workshops | Internet security,Authentication,Computer science,Formal validation,Computer network,Ticket,Security analysis,Wireless ad hoc network,Public-key cryptography,Authentication scheme |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Ons Chikhaoui | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
Aida Ben Chehida Douss | 2 | 1 | 3.39 |
Ryma Abassi | 3 | 24 | 10.45 |
Sihem Guemara El Fatmi | 4 | 40 | 13.24 |