Name
Abstract | ||
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In this paper we examine the use of covert channels based on CPU load in order to achieve persistent user identification through browser sessions. In particular, we demonstrate that an HTML5 video, a GIF image, or CSS animations on a webpage can be used to force the CPU to produce a sequence of distinct load levels, even without JavaScript or any client-side code.
These load levels can be then captured either by another browsing session, running on the same or a different browser in parallel to the browsing session we want to identify, or by a malicious app installed on the device. To get a good estimation of the CPU load caused by the target session, the receiver can observe system statistics about CPU activity (app), or constantly measure time it takes to execute a known code segment (app and browser). Furthermore, for mobile devices we propose a sensor-based approach to estimate the CPU load, based on exploiting disturbances of the magnetometer sensor data caused by the high CPU activity.
Captured loads can be decoded and translated into an identifying bit string, which is transmitted back to the attacker. Due to the way loads are produced, these methods are applicable even in highly restrictive browsers, such as the Tor Browser, and run unnoticeably to the end user. Therefore, unlike existing ways of web tracking, our methods circumvent most of the existing countermeasures, as they store the identifying information outside the browsing session being targeted.
Finally, we also thoroughly evaluate and assess each presented method of generating and receiving the signal, and provide an overview of potential countermeasures.
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Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1145/3212480.3212489 | WiSec '18: 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Stockholm
Sweden
June, 2018 |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
web tracking, user identification, covert channels, CPU, JavaScript, HTML5, CSS, Tor, electromagnetic emanations | Central processing unit,HTML5,Web page,Computer science,Code segment,Covert channel,Computer network,Mobile device,Bit array,JavaScript | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
978-1-4503-5731-9 | 1 | 0.36 |
References | Authors | |
18 | 7 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nikolay Matyunin | 1 | 1 | 0.36 |
| Nikolaos Anagnostopoulos | 2 | 22 | 9.61 |
| Spyros Boukoros | 3 | 7 | 2.91 |
| Markus Heinrich | 4 | 2 | 1.43 |
| André Schaller | 5 | 28 | 5.32 |
| Maksim Kolinichenko | 6 | 1 | 0.36 |
| Stefan Katzenbeisser | 7 | 1844 | 143.68 |