Title
Design Of Coalition Resistant Credit Score Functions For Online Discussion Forums
Abstract
We consider the problem of designing a robust credit score function in the context of online discussion forums. Credit score function assigns a real-valued credit score to each participant based on activities on the forum. A credit score of a participant quantifies the usefulness of contribution made by her. However, participants can manipulate a credit score function by forming coalitions, i.e., by strategically awarding upvotes, likes, etc. among a subset of agents to maximize their credit scores. We propose a coalition resistant credit score function which discourages such strategic endorsements. We use community detection algorithms to identify close-knit communities in the graph of interactions and characterize coalition identifying community detection metric. In particular, we show that modularity is coalition identifying and provide theoretical guarantees on modularity based credit score function. Finally, we validate our theoretical findings with simulations on illustrative datasets.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.5555/3237383.3237404
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS (AAMAS' 18)
Field
DocType
Citations 
Graph,Incentive design,Computer science,Credit score,Artificial intelligence,Online discussion,Machine learning,Modularity
Conference
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ganesh Ghalme111.71
Sujit Gujar27625.33
Amleshwar Kumar300.34
Shweta Jain4152.36
Y. Narahari569998.97