Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Stackelberg security games have received much attention in recent years. While most existing work focuses on single-defender settings, there are many real-world scenarios that involve multiple defenders (e.g., multi-national anti-crime actions in international waters, different security agencies patrolling the same area). In this paper, we consider security games with uncoordinated defenders who jointly protect a set of targets, but may have different valuations for these targets; each defender schedules their own resources and selfishly optimizes their own utility. We generalize the standard (single-defender) model of Stackelberg security games to this setting and formulate an equilibrium concept that captures the nature of strategic interaction among the players. We argue that an exact equilibrium may fail to exist, and, in fact, deciding whether it exists is NP-hard. However, under mild assumptions, every multi-defender security game admits an epsilon-equilibrium for every epsilon > 0, and the limit points corresponding to epsilon -> 0 can be efficiently approximated. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.5555/3237383.3237487 | PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS (AAMAS' 18) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Security games, Stackelberg games, multiple defenders | Mathematical economics,Computer science,Patrolling,Schedule,International waters,Stackelberg competition,Valuation (finance),Limit point,Distributed computing | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 16 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jiarui Gan | 1 | 39 | 9.05 |
| Edith Elkind | 2 | 1340 | 120.81 |
| Michael Wooldridge | 3 | 10010 | 810.27 |