Title
A Mathematical Model for Optimal Decisions in a Representative Democracy.
Abstract
Direct democracy, where each voter casts one vote, fails when the average voter competence falls below 50%. This happens in noisy settings when voters have limited information. Representative democracy, where voters choose representatives to vote, can be an elixir in both these situations. We introduce a mathematical model for studying representative democracy, in particular understanding the parameters of a representative democracy that gives maximum decision making capability. Our main result states that under general and natural conditions, 1. for fixed voting cost, the optimal number of representatives is linear; 2. for polynomial cost, the optimal number of representatives is logarithmic.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2018
ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 31 (NIPS 2018)
full spectrum,direct democracy,mathematical model,representative democracy
DocType
Volume
ISSN
Conference
31
1049-5258
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Malik Magdon-Ismail1914104.34
Lirong Xia2103486.84