Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Schelling’s segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant. Although the model is widely studied, no pure game-theoretic version where rational agents strategically choose their location exists. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing generalized game-theoretic models of Schelling segregation, where the agents can also have individual location preferences. |
Year | Venue | DocType |
|---|---|---|
2018 | SAGT | Conference |
Volume | Citations | PageRank |
abs/1806.08713 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
4 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ankit Chauhan | 1 | 6 | 2.15 |
| Pascal Lenzner | 2 | 5 | 4.50 |
| Louise Molitor | 3 | 1 | 4.08 |