Paper Info
Title
On elicitation-method effect in game experiments: a competing newsvendor perspective.
Abstract
To test the behavioral validity of the strategy method in a setting of operations management, we experimentally investigate competing newsvendor behavior under incomplete information with both the strategy method and the direct-response method. We observe that the “pull-to-center” effect exists only with low margin; mean order quantity with high margin does not significantly deviate from equilibrium prediction. We build a behavioral model based on overestimation and mean anchoring to explain competing newsvendor behavior. Estimates of the behavioral model confirm the existence of the behavioral biases. Meanwhile, order levels are not significantly different between the strategy method and the direct-response method. Hence, we suggest that the strategy method should lead to similar decisions in newsvendor settings compared to the direct-response method and may be adopted in most operations management settings associated to the newsvendor problem to improve the efficiency of experimental studies.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1057/s41274-017-0246-z
JORS
Keywords
Field
DocType
strategy method, competing newsvendor, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, overestimation, mean anchoring, behavioral operations
Newsvendor model,Mathematical economics,Extended newsvendor model,Anchoring,Computer science,Behavioral modeling,Bayesian game,Operations management,Complete information
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
69
4
0160-5682
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
17
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yukun Zhao100.68
Xiaobo Zhao211716.07