Paper Info
Title
The Shapley value of conjunctive-restricted games.
Abstract
We consider transferable utility games, where restricted cooperation is modeled by a fixed mapping assigning to each coalition the set of players that are controlled by this coalition. We study the Shapley value on the resulting class of restricted games, and provide axiomatic frameworks characterizing this value. Studies show that several classes of so-called conjunctive restrictions lead to frameworks similar to the original introduced by Shapley in 1953. We show that conjunctivity of the restriction is not only sufficient but also necessary.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.012
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
C71
Mathematical economics,Economics,Axiomatic system,Axiom,Shapley value,Transferable utility
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
108
0899-8256
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
1
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jean Derks17222.89