Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Information flow policies are widely used for specifying confidentiality and integrity requirements of security-critical systems. In contrast to access control policies and security protocols, they impose global constraints on the information flow and thus provide end-to-end security guarantees. The information flow policy that is usually adopted is noninterference. It postulates that confidential data must not affect the publicly visible behavior of a system. However, this requirement is usually broken in the presence of cryptographic operations. In this paper, we provide an extended definition of noninterference for systems that are specified in a MILS variant of the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL). More concretely, we propose a type system for MILS-AADL component definitions that distinguishes between breaking non-interference because of legitimate use of sufficiently strong encryption and breaking non-interference due to an unintended information leak. To this aim, it tracks both intraand inter-component information flow and considers both dataand event-flow security. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2015 | MILS@HiPEAC | Information flow (information theory),Cryptographic protocol,Type checking,Confidentiality,Cryptography,Computer science,Computer security,Real-time computing,Architecture Analysis & Design Language,Access control,Strong cryptography,Database |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kevin van der Pol | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Thomas Noll | 2 | 23 | 6.12 |