Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider a social cost minimization problem with equality and inequality constraints in which a central co-ordinator allocates infinitely divisible goods to self-interested N firms under information asymmetry. We consider the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and study its connection to an alternative mechanism based on market clearing-price. Under the considered set up, we show that the VCG payments are equal to the path integrals of the vector field of the market clearing prices, indicating a close relationship between the VCG mechanism and the "clearing-price" mechanism. We then discuss its implications for the electricity market design and also exploit this connection to analyze the budget balance of the VCG mechanism. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 2018 ANNUAL AMERICAN CONTROL CONFERENCE (ACC) | Social cost,Electricity market,Mathematical economics,Information asymmetry,Market clearing,Control theory,Computer science,Exploit,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Minification,Payment |
DocType | ISSN | Citations |
Conference | 0743-1619 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Takashi Tanaka | 1 | 34 | 12.22 |
| Na Li | 2 | 652 | 106.02 |
| Kenko Uchida | 3 | 60 | 18.80 |