Abstract | ||
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Lattice-based schemes are among the most promising post-quantum schemes, yet the effect of both parameter and implementation choices on their side-channel resilience is still poorly understood. Aysu et al. (HOST’18) recently investigated single-trace attacks against the core lattice operation, namely multiplication between a public matrix and a “small” secret vector, in the context of a hardware implementation. We complement this work by considering single-trace attacks against software implementations of “ring-less” LWE-based constructions. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2018 | 10.1007/978-3-030-10970-7_10 | IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Conference | 2018 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 6 | 5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Joppe W. Bos | 1 | 738 | 46.54 |
Simon Friedberger | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
Marco Martinoli | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |
Elisabeth Oswald | 4 | 197 | 17.67 |
Martijn Stam | 5 | 1659 | 67.36 |