Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
This paper gives a modular verification methodology in which, given parametric specifications of a key establishment protocol P and a protocol Q providing private channel communication, security and authenticity properties of their sequential composition (P; ;; Q) can be reduced to: (i) verification of corresponding properties for P, and (ii) verification of corresponding properties for an abstract version (Q^alpha ) of Q in which keys have been suitably abstracted. Our results improve upon previous work in this area in several ways. First of all, we both support a large class of equational theories and provide tool support via the Maude-NPA cryptographic protocol analysis tool. Secondly as long as certain conditions on P and Q guaranteeing the secrecy of keys inherited by Q from P are satisfied, our results apply to the composition of any two reachability properties of the two protocols. |
Year | Venue | Field |
---|---|---|
2018 | STM | Computer science,Computer security,Secrecy,Communication channel,Theoretical computer science,Key establishment protocol,Reachability,Parametric statistics,Cryptographic protocol analysis,Modular design |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
11 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Fan Yang | 1 | 9 | 1.15 |
Santiago Escobar | 2 | 452 | 27.87 |
Catherine Meadows | 3 | 928 | 89.05 |
José Meseguer | 4 | 9533 | 805.39 |