Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Tor provides low-latency anonymous and uncensored network access against a local or network adversary. Due to the design choice to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the pool of potential users) Tor allows some information about the client's connections to leak. Attacks using (features extracted from) this information to infer the website a user visits are called Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks. We develop a methodology and tools to measure the amount of leaked information about a website. We apply this tool to a comprehensive set of features extracted from a large set of websites and WF defense mechanisms, allowing us to make more fine-grained observations about WF attacks and defenses.
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Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1145/3243734.3243832 | ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Website Fingerprinting, Tor, Anonymity | Information leakage,Computer science,Design choice,Computer security,Adversary,Anonymity,Access network | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
978-1-4503-5693-0 | 6 | 0.45 |
References | Authors | |
20 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shuai Li | 1 | 33 | 2.32 |
| Huajun Guo | 2 | 7 | 1.15 |
| Nicholas Hopper | 3 | 1469 | 95.76 |