Paper Info
Title
The Convergence of Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy.
Abstract
In this paper, we study liquid democracy, a collective decision making paradigm which lies between direct and representative democracy. One main feature of liquid democracy is that voters can delegate their votes in a transitive manner such that: A delegates to B and B delegates to C leads to A delegates to C. We study the stability (w.r.t. voters preferences) of the delegation process in liquid democracy and model it as a game in which the players are the voters and the strategies are possible delegations. This game-theoretic model enables us to answer several questions on the equilibria of this process under general preferences and several types of restricted preferences (e.g., single-peaked preferences).
Year
Venue
Field
2018
arXiv: Artificial Intelligence
Convergence (routing),Delegate,Computer science,Microeconomics,Artificial intelligence,Representative democracy,Democracy,Delegation,Machine learning,Group decision-making,Transitive relation
DocType
Volume
Citations 
Journal
abs/1809.04362
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bruno Escoffier143037.32
Hugo Gilbert2108.01
Adèle Pass-Lanneau300.68