Abstract | ||
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The paper presents a model of large strategic dynamic interactions in an environment with uncertain fundamentals. The interaction is among a large finite group of interdependent players, diversified in their preferences and information. We study an imagined-continuum equilibrium, a behavioral hybrid of games with a continuum of players and finite games. This equilibrium enables simple Bayesian reasoning and admits natural Markov-perfect equilibria. In addition, we establish bounds on the probabilistic discrepancies between players' beliefs that are derived from the continuum model and the actual finite reality. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2018 | 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.001 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C72,C73 | Interdependence,Economics,Mathematical economics,Bayesian inference,Microeconomics,Repeated game,Probabilistic logic,Nash equilibrium,Finite group | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
178 | 0022-0531 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 7 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Ehud Kalai | 1 | 135 | 44.65 |
Eran Shmaya | 2 | 34 | 6.95 |