Paper Info
Title
Large strategic dynamic interactions.
Abstract
The paper presents a model of large strategic dynamic interactions in an environment with uncertain fundamentals. The interaction is among a large finite group of interdependent players, diversified in their preferences and information. We study an imagined-continuum equilibrium, a behavioral hybrid of games with a continuum of players and finite games. This equilibrium enables simple Bayesian reasoning and admits natural Markov-perfect equilibria. In addition, we establish bounds on the probabilistic discrepancies between players' beliefs that are derived from the continuum model and the actual finite reality.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.001
Journal of Economic Theory
Keywords
Field
DocType
C72,C73
Interdependence,Economics,Mathematical economics,Bayesian inference,Microeconomics,Repeated game,Probabilistic logic,Nash equilibrium,Finite group
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
178
0022-0531
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
7
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ehud Kalai113544.65
Eran Shmaya2346.95