Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Auctioning Electricity under Deep Renewable Integration using a Penalty for Shortfall. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We propose a mechanism for the ISO to allocate and sell renewable generation in a two-stage market to a number of strategic and flexible consumers. To offer an incentive to participate in the auction, the renewable generator promises to pay the cost associated with any shortfall in generation due to the uncertain nature of the traded resource. The ISO’s goal is to devise an auction mechanism that efficiently allocates electricity among consumers, while eliciting the true value functions from them. We analyze the resulting mechanism to show that it is incentive compatible in dominant strategy, individually rational, and budget-balanced. This mechanism guarantees the generator a positive expected profit. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1016/j.segan.2019.100266 | Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Renewable energy markets,Demand response,Auction theory | Journal | 20 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
2352-4677 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Balsam Dakhil | 1 | 0 | 1.01 |
| Abhishek Gupta | 2 | 14 | 10.61 |