Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
It is not fully understood how cooperation emerges in a population of individuals with no connections or prior experience with each other. Strategy selection that is purely based on accumulated payoffs promotes free riders who put their self interests above that of any group. How could cooperation persist in these settings? Researchers have posited direct or indirect reciprocity as possible explanations but these theories fail if interactions are not repeated or reputations are ignored. Altruistic punishment may provide an answer. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1016/j.biosystems.2018.10.015 | Biosystems |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Altruistic punishment,Public goods game,Social dilemma | Population,Positive economics,Biology,Nothing,Altruism,Reciprocity (evolution),Free rider problem,Reciprocity (social psychology),Artificial intelligence,Public goods game,Machine learning,Social dilemma | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
174 | 0303-2647 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 1 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Garrison W. Greenwood | 1 | 216 | 35.87 |
Hussein A. Abbass | 2 | 1503 | 144.85 |
Eleni Petraki | 3 | 19 | 6.20 |