Title
Simplifying optimal strategies in limsup and liminf stochastic games.
Abstract
We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games with the limsup and with the liminf payoffs. For the limsup payoff, we prove that the existence of an optimal strategy implies the existence of a stationary optimal strategy. Our construction does not require the knowledge of an optimal strategy, only its existence. The main technique of the proof is to analyze the game with specific restricted action spaces. For the liminf payoff, we prove that the existence of a subgame-optimal strategy (i.e. a strategy that is optimal in every subgame) implies the existence of a subgame-optimal strategy under which the prescribed mixed actions only depend on the current state and on the state and the actions chosen at the previous period. In particular, such a strategy requires only finite memory. The proof relies on techniques that originate in gambling theory.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1016/j.dam.2018.05.038
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Keywords
Field
DocType
Zero-sum game,Stochastic game,Optimal strategy,Stationary strategy
Discrete mathematics,Mathematical economics,Zero-sum game,Gambling and information theory,Subgame,Mathematics,Stochastic game
Journal
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
251
0166-218X
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.63
6
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
János Flesch110826.87
Arkadi Predtetchinski24512.27
William D. Sudderth36216.34