Paper Info
Title
Impact of Malicious SCADA Commands on Power Grids’ Dynamic Responses
Abstract
Control-related attacks can use malicious commands crafted in legitimate formats to initiate perturbations to power systems. Our previous work used the steady state of power systems (e.g., through power flow analysis) to estimate the consequences of such commands [1]. However, when power systems move from one steady state to another, their physical components go through a transient period, during which the system state can experience oscillations. An anomaly in an oscillation can make power systems lose synchronisms and experience catastrophic consequences. Analysis based on the steady state cannot understand and predict those harmful oscillations. In this paper, we study the impacts of control-related attacks on the dynamic responses of a power grid, by mapping malicious commands (e.g., that disconnect transmission lines) delivered via communication networks to power systems' electromechanical models. Based on theoretical analysis and numerical simulations, we find that it is challenging for attackers to destabilize a power system, but they can introduce large oscillations in the transient period and thereby cause physical damage.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1109/SmartGridComm.2018.8587462
2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)
Keywords
Field
DocType
system state,power system,steady state,control-related attacks,power grid,mapping malicious commands,power systems,malicious SCADA commands,power grids,power flow analysis
Power-flow study,Oscillation,Telecommunications network,Computer science,Electric power system,Electric power transmission,Real-time computing,Power grid,SCADA,Steady state,Electrical engineering
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
978-1-5386-7955-5
0
0.34
References 
Authors
2
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hui Lin1876.26
Zbigniew Kalbarczyk21896159.48
Ravishankar K. Iyer33489504.32