Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, we propose a new efficient value for transferable utility cooperative games with a coalition structure. It first assigns to every player his Aumann–Drèze value and then allocates the remainder of the worth of the grand coalition among players equally. As it is identical with the Aumann–Drèze value for coalitional games with a singleton coalition structure, we call it the egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann–Drèze value. We provide three axiomatizations of it and compare it with other well-known efficient coalitional values, especially the Owen value and the two-step Shapley value. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.1007/s10957-018-1440-0 | Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Transferable utility cooperative game,Coalition structure,Aumann–Drèze value,Owen value,Two-step Shapley value,91A12 | Journal | 181.0 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
3.0 | 1573-2878 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.37 | 10 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xun-Feng Hu | 1 | 1 | 0.37 |
| Genjiu Xu | 2 | 30 | 7.31 |
| Deng-Feng Li | 3 | 968 | 46.12 |