Title
Linearity of the core correspondence.
Abstract
Bloch and de Clippel (J Econ Theory 145:2424–2434, 2010) characterized sets of balanced TU-games on which the core correspondence is linear by means of an equivalence relation. We characterize maximal regions on which the core correspondence is linear in four different ways. First, by finitely many linear equalities and inequalities; thus, the core is piecewise linear. Second, maximal linear regions coincide with closures of equivalence classes (in the sense of Bloch and de Clippel) that are maximal w.r.t. set inclusion. Third, maximal linear regions coincide with closures of equivalence classes of full dimension. Fourth, for every extreme point of the core of a game in the interior of a maximal linear region, the collection of tight core inequalities constitutes a basis.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1007/s00182-017-0604-8
Int. J. Game Theory
Keywords
Field
DocType
Transferable utility games,Core correspondence,Piecewise linearity
Extreme point,Equivalence relation,Mathematical economics,Linearity,Pure mathematics,Equivalence class,Piecewise linear function,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
47
4
0020-7276
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
1
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Dénes Pálvölgyi110.72
Hans Peters23921.55
Dries Vermeulen37018.63