Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study the problem of designing dynamic double auctions for two-sided markets in which a platform intermediates the trade between one seller offering independent items to multiple buyers, repeatedly over a finite horizon, when agents have private values. Motivated by online advertising and ride-hailing markets, we seek to design mechanisms satisfying the following properties: no positive transfers, i.e., the platform never asks the seller to make payments nor buyers are ever paid and periodic individual rationality, i.e., every agent should derive a non-negative utility from every trade opportunity. We provide mechanisms satisfying these requirements that are asymptotically efficient and budget-balanced with high probability as the number of trading opportunities grows. Moreover, we show that the average expected profit obtained by the platform under these mechanisms asymptotically approaches first best (the maximum possible welfare generated by the market).
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Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2019 | 10.5555/3310435.3310446 | SODA '19: Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
San Diego
California
January, 2019 |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Revenue management,Discrete mathematics,Mathematical economics,Computer science,Common value auction | Conference | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Santiago R. Balseiro | 1 | 73 | 7.93 |
| VAHAB S. MIRROKNI | 2 | 4309 | 287.14 |
| renato paes | 3 | 331 | 36.45 |
| Song Zuo | 4 | 29 | 13.06 |