Title
Privacy-preserving combinatorial auction without an auctioneer
Abstract
Combinatorial auctions are employed into many applications such as spectrum auctions held by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). A crucial problem in such auctions is the lack of secure and efficiency mechanism to protect the privacy of the bidding prices and to ensure data security. To solve the problem, we propose an approach to represent the price as a polynomial’s degree based on verifiable secret sharing. So, we can obtain the two polynomials’s degree maximum/sum by the degree of the two polynomial’s degree sum/product. In the protocol, the bidders’ information is hidden. The auctioneers can receive the shares without a secure channel, so our protocol is more applicable to more scenarios. The scheme can resist the collusion attack, passive attack and so on. Moreover, Compared to Kikuchi (IEICE Trans Fundam Electron Commun Comput Sci 85(3):676–683, 2002); Suzuki and Yokoo (Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming with polynomial secret sharing, 2003), the proposed scheme has the authentication property without increasing the communications cost.
Year
DOI
Venue
2018
10.1186/s13638-018-1047-z
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Keywords
Field
DocType
Security,Verification,Combinatorial auctions,Dynamical programming,Secret sharing
Secure channel,Secret sharing,Combinatorial auction,Computer science,Computer network,Theoretical computer science,Verifiable secret sharing,Common value auction,Bidding,Spectrum auction,Passive attack
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
2018
1
1687-1499
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
4
0.42
21
Authors
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Chunqiang Hu140731.79
Ruinian Li2182.82
Bo Mei381.15
Wei Li433228.56
Arwa Alrawais512410.08
Rongfang Bie654768.23