Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider the problem of selling renewable electricity in a two-stage market to a number of load serving entities (LSEs). Since the generation is random, the renewable generator promises to pay a penalty, which is linear in the shortfall, to each LSE. We derive allocation and pricing rules that induce all load serving entities to truthfully bid their willingness to pay per unit of electricity in dominant strategies. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1109/CDC.2018.8619842 | 2018 IEEE CONFERENCE ON DECISION AND CONTROL (CDC) |
Field | DocType | ISSN |
Mathematical optimization,Renewable energy,Willingness to pay,Electricity,Computer science,Renewable generation,Environmental economics | Conference | 0743-1546 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Balsam Dakhil | 1 | 0 | 1.01 |
| Abhishek Gupta | 2 | 14 | 10.61 |