Title
Pareto optimal coalitions of fixed size.
Abstract
We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which differ in the size of the rooms to be filled, the orderedness or completeness of the preferences, and the way of calculating the value of a coalition---based on the best or worst roommate in the coalition. In all cases, we determine the complexity of finding a Pareto optimal assignment, and the complexity of verifying Pareto optimality for a given assignment.
Year
DOI
Venue
2019
10.22574/jmid.2019.11.003
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory
DocType
Volume
Issue
Journal
abs/1901.06737
1
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ágnes Cseh1205.80
Tamás Fleiner224127.45
Petra Harján300.34