Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are physical systems that are controlled or monitored by computer-based systems. CPS are a combination of computation, networking, and physical processes. As CPS are a combination of various diverse components, they are vulnerable to several security threats. Moreover, there are many different security domains (not just high/low, nor are they necessarily hierarchical). This paper utilizes previouslydeveloped Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility to uncover potential integrity vulnerabilities in an electric microgrid. These are then mitigated, to the extent possible, by adding executable invariants on system operation. Implementation on the Electric Power and Intelligent Control (EPIC) testbed at the Singapore University of Technology and Design are reported. Limitations of the design and successes/shortcomings of attack mitigation are reported. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2018 | 10.1109/PRDC.2018.00018 | 2018 IEEE 23rd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Security,Circuit breakers,Batteries,Cost accounting,Power systems,Relays | Security domain,Intelligent control,Electric power,Computer science,Electric power system,Testbed,Cyber-physical system,Microgrid,Distributed computing,Executable | Conference |
ISSN | ISBN | Citations |
1555-094X | 978-1-5386-5700-3 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prashanth Palaniswamy | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Bruce McMillin | 2 | 264 | 40.75 |